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  • BatmaninIraq's Avatar
    Today, 03:33 AM
    Rafidain Bank calls on the Central Bank to invest billions of deposits of its customers June 17 2018 10:26 PM registered and logged in to see this image.] Rafidain Bank Baghdad Post Iraq news Rafidain Bank, the central bank of Iraq, has called for the investment of billions of its customers' financial deposits in order to manage liquidity. The bank demanded, according to a document, to invest a fixed deposit, worth five hundred billion dinars, of customers' deposits, for thirty days, and the benefits scheduled monthly. He also demanded the investment of a fixed deposit of five hundred million dollars, for five years, renewed annually, with an annual interest of 1.5 ?? As a measure to manage the liquidity of the bank, as well as a deposit of two hundred and fifty million dollars, to invest the night, and according to the prescribed rate, of customer deposits. These measures, according to the directives of the Governor of the Central Bank, were to manage liquidity, to hedge and to meet withdrawals from the bank's customers and deposits.
    107 replies | 15598 view(s)
  • Brazileiro's Avatar
    Today, 12:09 AM
    and hopefully Warka gets their Mastercard back again shortly...and their corresponding banks,,,,and their CD's,,,,,
    107 replies | 15598 view(s)
  • BatmaninIraq's Avatar
    Yesterday, 10:27 PM
    The International Islamic Bank announces About the launch of the first MasterCard card in the Iraqi dinar currency It means to be ruffled shop and withdraw from any ATM in Iraqi dinars and they are removing the currency. And the biggest surprise. Ruffled your card is used outside Iraq and via the Internet and the price of the discharge is based on the official price of the central Bank of Iraq. Charge your electronic wallet in Iraqi dinars and use it wherever you want and stay safe and dont get confused The card version is only 10,000 IQD
    107 replies | 15598 view(s)
  • crazyfrank's Avatar
    Yesterday, 10:19 PM
    Calstar, Yes give it a shot again, they are clearly responding to many peeps here now as we see. Please let us know how you make out ok?
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    Yesterday, 08:50 PM
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    Yesterday, 06:29 PM
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    Yesterday, 05:59 PM
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    Yesterday, 05:40 PM
    CRIMINAL IN A ROBE - Here's the Rundown on the Corrupt Obama-Appointed Judge Who Tossed Manafort in Jail Guest post by Joe Hoft It sure seems like every Obama appointed judge is a far left radical who puts their own distorted interpretation of reality ahead of the US Constitution. In this respect, US District Judge Amy Berman Jackson is a case study. This past week she again showed that she puts politics before the law. Her actions with Paul Manafort alone are cause for her to be removed or impeached. We reported two months ago and again earlier this month, that Obama appointed liberal activist Judge, Amy Berman Jackson, was assigned to the most important court case in US history. Sadly, Judge Jackson has a horrible far left record on the bench. In 2013 Judge Jackson rejected arguments from the Catholic Church that Obamacare's requirements that employers provide cost free coverage to contraceptive services is contrary to their religious beliefs and violated their religious and free speech freedoms. This was overturned by the Supreme Court. In 2017 Judge Jackson dismissed the wrongful death suit against Hillary Clinton filed by two of the families who lost loved ones in Benghazi. The families argued that Clinton had done little to help their sons and then lied to cover it up. Then on January 19th of this year, a Paul Manafort's case was reassigned to Judge Jackson on January 19th, a few weeks after being filed. It is unknown why she was assigned to this case or by whom. What is clear is that with her atrocious and slanted record to date, the Deep State and the Mueller team certainly wanted Judge Jackson overseeing the Manafort case and this is supported by her record to date. On January 3rdwe reported that Paul Manafort filed a suit against the "Deep State" DOJ (Jeff Sessions), Assistant AG Rod Rosenstein and Corrupt Investigator Robert Mueller that would possibly shut down Mueller's corrupt investigation! We reported for months on the many criminal and corrupt actions taken by numerous parties related to the Mueller investigation. Mueller never should have taken on the job in the first place due to numerous conflicts. He is best friends with fired leaker and former FBI Director James Comey. He met with Comey shortly before Comey testified with Congress and stratigized with him. For this alone he should have recused himself. The team Mueller built to attack President Trump and have him removed is all Deep State liberal attorneys and crooks. Mueller's record in the past is scattered with actions that let the Clintons off scot-free on numerous occasions when they should have been put in jail. We now know that the FBI had an investigation into the Clintons and moneys they received from Russia in return for giving Russia 20% of all US uranium. Prior to the Obama administration approving the very controversial Uranium One deal in 2010 handing Russia 20% of America's Uranium, the FBI had evidence that Russian nuclear industry officials were involved in bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money laundering in order to benefit Vladimir Putin. The FBI approved the deal anyway. We also know that Rosenstein and Mueller were the ones who allowed the Uranium One deal to go forward. This was the real Russia collusion story involving the US government. We know that Mueller's team illegally obtained emails related to the Trump transition team and these emails were protected under attorney-client privilege. Mueller and his entire team should have resigned after this. But perhaps one of the most damning aspects of the Mueller investigation is that it is not legal. The corrupt Mueller investigation is tasked with finding a crime that does not exist in the law. It is a legal impossibility. Mueller is being asked to do something that is manifestly unattainable. FOX News Legal Analyst Gregg Jarrett explained this in an article last year that the entire Mueller investigation is lawless. To put it plainly, Mueller is tasked with finding a crime that does not exist in the law. It is a legal impossibility. He is being asked to do something that is manifestly unattainable.Manafort sued the DOJ, Mueller and Rosenstein because what they are doing is not supported by US Law. Manafort's case also argued in paragraph 33 of its filing that the special counsel put in place by crooked Rosenstein gave crooked and criminal Mueller powers that are not permitted by law. Mueller was given the latitude to investigate whatever he wanted to and that is not permitted by the law. Manafort's filing paragraph 33 stated - But paragraph (b)(ii) of the Appointment Order purports to grant Mr. Mueller further authority to investigate and prosecute "any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation." That grant of authority is not authorized by DOJ's special counsel regulations. It is not a "specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated." Nor is it an ancillary power to address efforts to impede or obstruct investigation under 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a). Manafort's case was solid but the judge was Obama's corrupt liberal Judge Jackson. On April 27, 2018, Judge Jackson dismissed Manafort's plea. It is very clear that Manafort's argument was valid. There is no crime in US law for collusion and Rosenstein's order allowing Mueller to look at whatever he wants was challenged in another Manafort case that Mueller filed against him in Virginia. Judge T.S. Ellis blasted prosecutors, saying he believes Robert Mueller is effectively using the Paul Manafort case to provide material that would lead to Trump's "prosecution or impeachment". He also condemned the investigation for having no barriers. A federal judge in a hearing about @PaulManafort bank fraud charges, is saying the special counsel should not have "unfettered power," raising questions about the scope of the investigation. CLICK HERE for ENTIRE STORY
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    Yesterday, 04:18 PM
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • haggisbasher's Avatar
    Yesterday, 03:51 PM
    no didn't send to 4044,sent it to Mohammad I Kassa ifrd@warka-bank-iq.com with Hotmail.com .and the reply back came from ifrd@warka-bank-iq.com & Laith Alamir e-bank.ms@warka-bank-iq.com hope this helps.
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • Brazileiro's Avatar
    Yesterday, 10:39 AM
    BatmaninIraq I sent you a pm but this is how I thought the process to work,,, I would transfer half the total IQD to your warka account, when you receive the IQD you transfer the USD to my account in Canada, and when I recieve the USD I would transfer the remaining IQD to your Warka account. For example - if you wanted to exchange $5000 USD = $11,900,000 IQD ($5000x2380). I would email the transfer request with color copies of our passports to Mr Issa requesting to transfer $5,950,000 IQD to your Warka account. You would then wire the $5000 USD to my account in Canada. When I receive your wire transfer I transfer the remaining $5,950,000 IQD to your Warka account. PM me if interested.
    12 replies | 1117 view(s)
  • BatmaninIraq's Avatar
    Yesterday, 03:47 AM
    I want to buy His dinar any advice???/
    12 replies | 1117 view(s)
  • calstar's Avatar
    Yesterday, 01:11 AM
    Thanks Frank......Now maybe I can get a password :rolleyes:
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • crazyfrank's Avatar
    Yesterday, 12:55 AM
    Thanks for your input HB, can you share what e-mail address responded to your recent request? was it the 4044 address?
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • haggisbasher's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 06:38 PM
    I would like to add that i asked for a account password and 24 hours later it was sent to me,and this was during Ramadan so they are obviousy been working,looking forword to Warka's return to normal operations.
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • Wolverine's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 06:36 PM
    15 replies | 263 view(s)
  • Brazileiro's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 03:10 PM
    thanks for the info crazyfrank
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • crazyfrank's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 02:51 PM
    ok we all be in pause mode now, as the Ramadan hootinanne square dance is in full swing, and they have gone into radio silence, so its time to reflect on where we be now on all this. I myself was pulled back into watching all this by something 2 months ago, after being away for 8 years back on planet earth. So I believe there is a reasonable chance something positive is due to occur, but lets review. Warka has cleared whatever the issues were, and have been given a green light to be re-listed on the ISX. Warka has announced a 1 IQD share offer. Warka has, by now, finished house cleaning of all Warka shares held in "proxy" status Warka communication/correspondence has been seen to be radically increased and improved to clients There is speculation (unverified) the UN has released assets previously frozen in association with sanctions put in place against Saddam Husain from long ago There is speculation the Central Bank of Iraq CBI, has now, as of 6/15/18, concluded a 90 day period of currency drift held within 2 %. thereby meeting an IMF benchmark. There is firm notification that Visa/MasterCard's are being issued There is firm notification from the CBI that point of sale terminals will now offer a cash back option. There is speculation about public signage nationwide about the withdrawal of US Dollars being no longer available from ATM machines There is speculation on ATM machines being either loaded with new software, and, or smaller currency for impending distribution. The general elections were held, with some unexpected new bed fellows on the batting order, and final government seating is due to be announced after Ramadan @ June 20th. The ISX, the banks, and the government is now in sleep mode this weekend as the final dance card has been issued for Ramadan, and reopen for what may lovingly be called "normal" operations again on June 20th, 2018 This pretty much sums things up to now, and its all fairly positive. Long ago and far away now here on this forum board there was such a series of events similar to all these. I vaguely recall a count down clock was generated at the top of the forum page back then. I doubt its needed here again, but we may hopefully agree June 20th is a day to look at all news yes?
    6 replies | 209 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 10:55 AM
    Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned the arrests to which two investigative reporters have been subjected in different parts of Iraq in the past few days in connection with their coverage of corruption, and calls for an end to the harassment of these journalists. The latest victim was Mostafa Hamed, a reporter based in Fallujah, in the western province of Al Anbar, where he works for the local TV channel Sharqeya. He was arrested at his home at 2 a.m. on 9 June by policemen who did not tell him what he was charged with, and was finally released today without being charged. According to the information gathered by the Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO), RSF’s partner NGO in Iraq, Hamed had been investigating the involvement of Fallujah city hall leaders in a real estate scandal. Sharqeya is owned by Saad al Bazzaz, a local businessman and political rival of Al Anbar’s governor, who tried to get the TV channel closed last December. The other recent victim is Hossam al Kaabi (pictured), a reporter based in Najaf, 180 km south of Baghdad, who has repeatedly been harassed in connection with his coverage of an alleged corruption case involving the Najaf provincial airport’s former governing board. What with money, women and threats, every kind of method has been used in an attempt to silence his reporting on the case, he said. The corruption case is however by no means a secret. He has also been the target of dozens of legal actions. The latest method was an arrest warrant, which resulted in his having to pay the large sum of 15 million dinars (10,745 euros) in bail to obtain his release on 6 June. The warrant was the result of a complaint filed by Najaf airport’s former administration four days after Kaabi’s main media outlet, the NRT network’s Arabic-language channel, was forced to close for financial reasons. Defended by a consortium of lawyers, Kaabi told RSF he is concerned about the outcome because of the lack of judicial independence in Iraq. “These two arrest warrants highlight the different kinds of difficulties for journalists in Iraq, which not only include being unjustly prosecuted but also the risk of seeing your work used for the purposes of the political rivalry,” said Sophie Anmuth, the head of RSF’s Middle East desk. “The absurd proceedings against Hossam al Kaabi must be dropped and the authorities must do their duty to protect journalists who are the target of threats.” As Kaabi points out on Facebook, in theory Iraqi law protects the right of journalists to seek information and sources. But in practice, as JFO has often reported, local officials act with impunity when they use judicial pressure and sometimes death threats to pressure journalists who investigate corruption. Iraq is ranked 160th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2018 World Press Freedom Index. (Source: RSF) Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 37 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-16-2018, 10:55 AM
    GardaWorld, a global leader in comprehensive security and risk management, has made its weekly security report available to Iraq Business News readers. Prepared by GardaWorld’s Risk Analysis Team in Iraq, this essential report includes short- and medium-term outlooks on the security situation, reports and commentary on recent significant events, and a detailed overview of developments across the country. Please click here to download the latest report free of charge. For more information on how GardaWorld’s services can support your business in Iraq, please contact Daniel Matthews, Senior Director Iraq, at daniel.matthews@garda.com Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 43 view(s)
  • Brazileiro's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 04:08 PM
    Still getting the run around from my other bank. If anyone is interested in doing between a 2k-5k usd transfer for iqd at double the cbi official rate contact me via pm. CBI official rate is 1190 so I'd transfer 2380 x ?usd = ???iqd from my warka account to your warka account and you'd wire the usd to my account in canada.
    12 replies | 1117 view(s)
  • thebest's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:15 PM
    Has more than a year created.
    6 replies | 274 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    By John Lee. The United Nations has advertised new positions in Iraqi Kurdistan: Driver & Logistics Clerk, UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Information Management Expert, UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Information Management Associate, UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Human Resources Assistant, UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Mental health coordinator, Médicos del Mundo Human Resources Coordinator, Premičre Urgence Internationale (PUI) International Crisis Management Advisor, UNDP – United Nations Development Programme (Source: UN) (Picture: Success, growth, career, development signpost from 3D_Creation/Shutterstock) Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 65 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    By John Lee. The United Nations has advertised new positions in Iraq: Fleet Logistic Assistant, International Rescue Committee (IRC) Senior Area Coordinator, International Rescue Committee (IRC) Safe Return Project Manager, Heartland Alliance for Human Needs Deputy Head of Office – Programmes, Save the Children Health Program Manager, Save the Children Senior Electoral Officer, UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (Source: UN) (Picture: Finger pressing a new career start button, from Olivier Le Moal/Shutterstock) Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 63 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    The UN Security Council has extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq*(UNAMI) by 10*months until 31*May*2019, adopting a streamlined text that would advance the Mission’s role in the Middle East nation’s post?conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Unanimously adopting resolution 2421*(2018), the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary?General and UNAMI would, at the request of the Government of Iraq, give priority to the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community?level reconciliation. More specifically, by the terms of the resolution, the Special Representative and the Mission would assist the Government and relevant institutions in such areas as electoral processes, constitutional review, and regional dialogue and cooperation on matters including border security, energy, environment, water and refugees. In coordination with the Government, UNAMID would also — among other things*— promote, support and facilitate the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve Iraq’s capacity to provide civil, social and essential services to its people. Also by the terms of the resolution, the Mission would promote accountability and support the work of the investigative team established by resolution*2379*(2017) to collect, store and preserve evidence in Iraq of acts that could amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Furthermore, it would assist the Government in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels, and participate in efforts to strengthen child protection. Walter Miller (United States) said the renewal marked the Mission’s first major overhaul since resolution*1770*(2007) was adopted 11*years ago, noting that Council members decided to extend this year’s mandate for a period of 10*months to better align with the United Nations budget cycle.* The document had been trimmed down from seven to two*pages of text, although it was important to note the complexity of the challenges UNAMI and Iraq faced moving forward.* He stressed the need to coordinate closely with other United Nations agencies in Iraq to ensure continuity of efforts on humanitarian and development issues on the national and community levels.* The World Bank was doing great work to stabilize Iraq’s financial footing, although more effort was needed on sustainable development, particularly concerning the country’s water issues and the dust storms that plagued the Iraqi people. Carl Orrenius Skau (Sweden) welcomed the inclusion of an operative women, peace and security component in UNAMI’s mandate, which would allow the Mission to further enhance its efforts to ensure women’s full and meaningful participation in the political process.* Sweden also welcomed the inclusion of a component aimed at strengthening child protection efforts in Iraq, with a focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration of children in UNAMI’s mandate. The meeting began at 10:02 a.m. and ended at 10:09 a.m. Resolution The full text of resolution 2421 (2018) reads as follows: “The Security Council, “Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq, in particular 1500*(2003), 1546*(2004), 1557*(2004), 1619*(2005), 1700*(2006), 1770*(2007), 1830*(2008), 1883*(2009), 1936*(2010), 2001*(2011), 2061*(2012), 2110*(2013), 2169*(2014), 2233*(2015), 2299*(2016), 2379*(2017), and reiterating resolution 2107*(2013) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, and the values set forth in 2367*(2017), “Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Iraq, and emphasizing the importance of the stability and security of Iraq for the people of Iraq, the region and the international community, particularly in light of Iraq’s victory over the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant*(ISIL, also known as Da’esh), “Supporting Iraq in addressing the challenges it faces as it turns to the task of post?conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, including the requirement to meet the needs of all Iraqis, including women, youth, children, displaced persons and persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, “1.** Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq*(UNAMI) until 31*May*2019; “2.** Decides further that the Special Representative of the Secretary?General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary?General (document*S/2018/430), shall (a)* prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community?level reconciliation; (b)* further advise, support, and assist: (i) the Government of Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commission on the development of processes for holding elections and referenda; (ii) the Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives on constitutional review, the implementation of constitutional provisions, as well as on the development of processes acceptable to the Government of Iraq to resolve disputed internal boundaries; (iii) the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on issues of border security, energy, environment, water, and refugees; (iv) the Government of Iraq with progress on security sector reform efforts, on planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups, where and as appropriate, in coordination with other multinational entities; (c)* promote, support and facilitate, in coordination with the Government of Iraq: (i) the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly and voluntary return, as appropriate, of refugees and displaced persons, including through the efforts of the United Nations country team; (ii) the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve Iraq’s capacity to provide effective civil, social and essential services for its people and continue active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance programmes; (iii) Iraqi, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other efforts on economic reform, capacity?building and setting conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors and other international institutions; (iv) the contributions of UN agencies, funds, and programmes to the objectives outlined in this resolution under the unified leadership of the Secretary?General through the Special Representative for Iraq, supported by their designated Deputy; (d)* promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the investigative team established in resolution*2379*(2017); (e)* approach gender mainstreaming as a cross?cutting issue throughout its mandate and to advise and assist the Government of Iraq in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels; (f)* and assist Government of Iraq and United Nations country team efforts to strengthen child protection, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of children; “3.** Recognizes that security of United Nations personnel is essential for UNAMI to carry out its work for the benefit of the people of Iraq and calls upon the Government of Iraq to continue to provide security and logistical support to the United Nations presence in Iraq; “4.** Expresses its intention to review the mandate of UNAMI by 31*May*2019 or sooner, if requested by the Government of Iraq; “5.** Welcomes the results of the independent external assessment of UNAMI as requested by resolution*2367*(2017), its findings and its recommendations, and encourages UNAMI, the Secretariat and United Nations agencies, offices, funds and programs to implement those recommendations; “6.** Requests the Secretary?General to report to the Council every three*months on the progress made towards the fulfilment of all UNAMI’s responsibilities, including actions taken in response to the independent external assessment; “7.** Decides to remain seized of the matter.” (Source: UN) Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 65 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    Advertising FeatureRabee Securities Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) market report (week ending: 14th June 2018). Note: ISX will be closed starting from June 17, 2018 to June 19, 2018 due to the religious holiday of Eid Al-Fitr. The next trading session will be held on Wednesday (June 20, 2018). Please click here to download a table of listed companies and their associated ticker codes. The RSISX index ended the week at IQD803 (-0.5%) / $861 (-0.5%) (weekly change) (-1.1% and +3.0% YTD change, respectively). The number of week traded shares was 7.6 bn and the weekly trading volume was IQD4.2bn ($3.5 mn). ISX Company Announcements The Central Bank of Iraq decided to allow citizens to withdraw cash from the points of sale deployed at the agents of electronic payment companies and traders in the Iraqi market. (CBI) Mosul Bank (BMFI) resumed trading on June 14, 2018 after discussing and approving 2016 annual financial results. International Islamic Bank (BINT) resumed trading on June 10, 2018 after providing its 2016 annual and 6M17 financial results. Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 68 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    By John Lee. The National Investment Commission (NIC), and the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances, have announced an opportunity to invest in the rehabilitation, modernization and operation of the Samarra drugs plant. In a statement, the NIC said: “It invites reliable Arab and foreign companies directly or their agents – not mediator or supported – to participate in this investment opportunity to rehabilitate and modernize this plant on basisof participating in management, production, increasing the production capacities and take pasrt in this valuable opportunity to satisfy the Iraqi market demands and for the economic feasibility and the realizable privileges for the investors such as the availability of the essential materials for production . “Willing investors can obtain the investment profile from the company HQ in Samarra as per the companies law no. 22 for the year 1997 as amended, article 15/3rd ; for an amount of (500,000) IDR non- refundable. “The company shall offer all detailed information and facilitate the visit to the plan. Applications shall be according to the terms stated in the investment profile , provided that applications should be submitted by a sealed envelope before the end of the work time of Thursday 12.07.2018.“ You may also visit the website www.sdisamarra.com More details can be downloaded here (English from page 43) (Source: National Investment Commission) Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
    0 replies | 61 view(s)
  • Investors Iraq News's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 02:10 PM
    By Ahmed Tabaqchali (pictured), CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund. This article was originally published in the Marsh to Mountain blog. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News. “Forget the Donations, Stupid”: New dynamics in funding the reconstruction of IraqKey Takeaways In the months following the Kuwait Conference a sea change has taken place in Iraq’s financial health that has yet to be reflected in perceptions. Higher oil prices, as a result of the changed dynamics of the oil market and the robust health of the global economy, has had a transformative effect on Iraq’s finances. By end of 2018, based on realized oil prices of 2018 and average year-to-date for 2018, Iraq is on its way to have a cumulative two-year budget surplus of $18.8bn instead of the initially projected cumulative deficit of $19.4bn. * This would allow it to start the reconstruction process on its own resources. Coupled with a potential surplus of $9.3bn in 2019 would give the country a great deal of flexibility to fund further reconstruction over the near-term.* The surplus of $18.8bn by end of 2018 would equal a stimulus of 14.5% of non-oil GDP once reconstruction projects are underway, which would further accelerate economic activity.* However, this three-year window of opportunity faces the twin headwinds of Iraq’s corrosive corruption and all of prior governments’ failures to spend oil wealth on* rebuilding the country’s infrastructure, spending it instead on expanding the state’s role in the economy. ——————————————————————- A great deal has changed since the Kuwait Conference on the reconstruction of Iraq, which was marred by misconceptions of international observers who bemoaned that it failed to achieve its objective in raising enough donations. These were not helped by an Iraqi side that went to the conference looking for donations (investments in Iraqi speak) by focusing its efforts solely on presenting a shopping list of projects that needed $88bn in funding over five years. These misconceptions were addressed in a prior article which highlighted that over five years, Iraq should be able to fund $77bn out of this $88bn through a combination of $50bn from its oil revenues and $27bn in borrowings. Crucially, this level of direct funding and borrowing would be consistent with maintaining macroeconomic stability, which means that funding the reconstruction would not distract from the government fulfilling its traditional role in the economy, and so the reconstruction will contribute to sustainable economic growth. This ability to fund the $77bn was derived from the IMF estimates for Iraq’s budget for 2018-2022 based on updated market-implied future Iraq oil prices, i.e. the implicit price of oil from the futures markets. In February, the implied price for Iraqi oil was $60/bbl for 2018, declining to $51 by 2022. These are in sharp contrast to the IMF’s estimates in August 2017 which used Iraqi oil prices of $45.5 in 2018, increasing to $47.2 by 2022. The 2018-2022 estimates made in 2017 would have made it impossible for Iraq to fund any portion of the needed funding as it would have needed to borrow to balance its budget during these years. Iraq’s high dependence on oil means that its budget and GDP are highly sensitive to the volume of oil it exports and to oil prices. The massive change in oil prices over the last few years, as seen from the five-year Brent crude price chart below, played havoc with Iraq’s budget during the ISIS conflict 2014-2017. They forced the government into a sharp fiscal retrenchment by cutting costs and cancelling all investment spending, while increasing military spending which had substantial negative knock-on effects on the economy. The significant effects of oil price changes extend to planning for funding the reconstruction directly by Iraq, and indirectly by its stakeholders who need to take into account these effects in relation to their level of contributions and expected investment returns. Brent Crude Jun 2013-Jun 2018, Source: Financial TimesThe fundamentals of the oil market went through major changes over the last four years, from expectations of supply scarcity versus increasing demand up to mid-2014; fears of increasing supply overwhelming decreasing demand from mid-2014 into late-2016; easing somewhat to hopes for a rebalance by mid 2017; and finally, into growing demand exceeding declining supply. Overlay the robust health of the global economy and it is expected the oil market will continue to tighten in the immediate future. This outlook is complicated by disruptive technologies such as those behind the Shale oil boom in the US, and by geopolitics affecting major suppliers such as Iran and Venezuela. These are balanced somewhat by OPEC’s actions and shifting perceptions of either its increasing dominance or increasing irrelevance. These perceptions came into sharp focus with the OPEC & non-OPEC supply cut agreement in late 2016 that started the recovery process. Recently there is news that talks have been underway to increase supply as prices have risen too high in response to threats to Iranian and Venezuelan supplies. These would make budget planning, let alone long-term reconstruction planning, for Iraq an exercise in folly if it were to use the latest market implied future prices or to accept the prevailing wisdom at any given time as a basis for planning. This pretty much explains the conservative assumptions used by the IMF -which the world financial community depends on in assessing Iraq’s financial soundness and its credit worthiness. These assumptions served as the basis on which Iraq and the IMF identified creditors and donors for Iraq to cover its estimated budget deficits for 2017-2022 as part of the IMF’s 2016 Standby agreement.* Moreover, the IMF updated these assumptions with new estimates for forward oil prices as part of its Kuwait Conference presentation. A recent article noted “using realized prices of Iraqi oil of $49.1/bbl for 2017, and assuming Iraqi oil prices of $60/bbl for 2018, then declining to $51/bbl in 2022, would produce a cumulative surplus of $47.4bn for 2017-2022 instead of the earlier assumed cumulative deficit of $17.6bn”.* While using higher estimates for oil prices would result in a cumulative surplus of $78.2bn. In the first scenario Iraq could fund the reconstruction by a combination of $50bn from its oil revenues and $27bn from borrowings, and the final $11bn from aid/donations, which is in-line with the assumptions made by the IMF at the Kuwait conference.* While, in the second scenario Iraq could fund the reconstruction by a combination of $80bn from its oil revenues and $8bn from borrowings which is a vastly different proposition. Given the impossibility of forecasting future oil prices, especially up to 2022, this article will consider the data for 2017-2019 given the higher degree of predictability in this short timeframe. The IMF updated its global growth projections to +3.9% for both 2018 & 2019, up from its previous projections of 3.7% for both which was made in late 2017 as part of its World Economic Outlook (WEO) in April. It believes that the upswing that began in 2016 has accelerated since then but it expects that it will taper off afterword’s. These coupled with changed dynamics in the oil supply/demand imply higher oil price assumptions for the period, which for the short-term has positive implications for oil exporting nations in MENA as outlined in its Regional Economic Outlook (ROE) May. For Iraq, these would have huge implications for its economic profile for 2017-2019 and thus to its ability to start funding the huge reconstruction demands. The table below looks at the original IMF estimates for Iraq’s budget 2017-2019 versus updated estimates for 2017-2019 based on the latest actual data for 2017 and updated estimates for oil prices. For sources & assumptions see endnoteThe updated assumptions for 2017-2019 imply a cumulative surplus of $28.1bn vs earlier assumptions of a cumulative deficit of $22.8. Although Iraq has identified funding sources for each year during the budget planning stages, it is likely that it would have not utilized them due to the higher revenues as a result of the higher than planned oil prices. These unused funding sources could be as high as $14.3bn. Irrespective of the above, the upcoming government should have a cumulative surplus of $18.8bn by the end of 2018 which can be used to start the reconstruction process, which coupled with the likely surplus of $9.3bn in 2019 would give the country a great deal of flexibility to fund further reconstruction over the near-term. This flexibility would be augmented by $30bn, over five years, in investments and trade credit guarantees that Iraq received during the Kuwait Conference in February. The effect of this spending flexibility on economic activity is enormous, in that should the surpluses be spent on reconstruction from 2019 over a two-year period, this would be equivalent to an economic stimulus of 14.5% of 2019’s non-oil GDP over this period. This is a major economic stimulus by any account that would be magnified over the next five-years should the $30bn in pledges that Iraq received materialize. However, the risk, and the likelihood, is that the upcoming government would succumb to public pressures to use some of this extra fiscal flexibility on populist measures. Such pressures have already been applied by parliament as it amended the budget by removing the 3.8% tax on salaries and pensions to appease an angry electorate in an election year. The elections marked by the continued pro-reform demonstrations since 2015, and the large active non-participation movement imply that the upcoming government would increase spending on populist measures to pacify the electorate and provide a visible peace divided.* In fact, the updated estimates for 2018 & 2109 in the table above reflect the expectations of higher expenditures, which would narrow the surplus for these two years, which in turn would detract from the funds available for infrastructure investment. A further risk is the country’s corrosive corruption which would find breathing space as a result of higher oil revenues, especially if they are spent on populist measures, in the process relieving public pressures on the government to reform and to expose corruption. Moreover, the practice post-2003 of using state contracts as a means of reinforcing political influence on selected players in the private sector could continue, further entrenching corruption, with the government ability to fund the reconstruction and ability to award contracts. Even, if the government would not succumb to populist measures, it would still need to resort to borrowing to continue funding the reconstruction. This is especially true given the high level of government expenditures, especially its public-sector payroll and social security spending. Moreover, higher oil prices for 2017-2019 will likely lead to the government to slow the pace of fiscal consolidation in response to public demands. This therefore means that budget surpluses will decline in time, especially as oil prices are likely to moderate in the coming years. Borrowing, especially from the commercial debt markets, imposes a much-needed discipline on the government to adhere to sound fiscal policy and to continue the path of reducing its role in the economy and encouraging the development of the private sector. Combined with the IMF’s 2016 Stand-By Agreement (SBA) this should help ensure sustainable macroeconomic stability. Iraq’s ability to assume debt that is sustainable and within the confines of maintaining macroeconomic stability is much higher than assumed by many who merely look at the headline figure. An upcoming report by the author looks into the composition and background of Iraq’s debt. The IMF estimates the total debt to be $122.9bn by end of 2017, made up of external debt of $73.7bn and domestic debt of $49.2bn. However, $41bn out the external debt is to non-Paris Club creditors, mostly the GCC nations, that date back to the pre-2003 regime which are under negotiations to reduce them on the same terms as applied by the Paris Club of creditors. Should this happen they would likely be reduced by 90% to $4.1bn. Therefore, including the unused borrowing for the 2017 deficit, this means that actual debt by end of 2017 is more likely to be $71.7bn than the headline figure of $122.9bn. This would imply debt/GDP ratios of 37.3% for 2017 and 32.1% for 2018, giving Iraq plenty of scope to assume debts of up to $40bn and still keep debt/GDP ratio under 50% for 2018. A sea change in Iraq’s position has taken place since the months leading up to the Kuwait Conference, but perceptions have not. Iraq’s position was that of a country with a debt/GDP ratio of 63.8%/65.3% for 2017/18, that needs to borrow to fund its budget deficit for the next few years and thus needs aid/donations to fund an urgent and massive reconstruction. The sea change, based on the IMF’s May REO, is that Iraq now has a debt/GDP ratio of 58%/54.7% for 2017/18, a budget surplus and can start to fund its reconstruction. This article further shows that Iraq can start funding its reconstruction in 2018 with $18.8bn in cumulative surpluses based on current oil prices. If the argument above on the underlying nature of its debt were to unfold then Iraq can add to this by accessing $40bn in the debt markets- which is far more than its immediate needs for reconstruction. The underlying positive for Iraq that is fortunately to a large extent free from any government planning, or mismanagement, is that the reconstruction along the lines described by the joint study of the World Bank Group (WBG) and Iraq’s Ministry of Planning (MoP), on its own, will generate substitutional non-oil economic activity. This activity can over the course of the next five years provide the non-oil economy with sufficient momentum for Iraq to escape its high oil dependence, which no government has attempted before. The silver lining of the trauma caused by the ISIS conflict, coupled with collapsing oil prices was that Iraq, in spite of all the improbable odds, united and climbed its way out of the abyss and of total disintegration. Given Iraq’s ability to start self-funding the reconstruction, a similar silver lining is that the recovery from the same trauma, in the form of reconstruction, could lead the country’s evolution away from pure oil dependence. Disclaimer Ahmed Tabaqchali’s comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/02/22/its-not-the-donations-stupid-key-points-from-kuwait-conf/ – _edn3 IMF’s estimates and presentation in the Kuwait conference are at:* Session 3 after clicking on the pdf icon of the presentation. Presentation starts at minute 8.20 on the youtube link on the link below: – https://view.publitas.com/1692ac51-faf7-464f-a9c2-1784ed1da647/iraq-reconstruction-and-investment-part-3-investment-opportunities-and-reforms/page/1 IMF’s earlier estimates are from Country Report No. 17/251 2017 estimates: Oil exports accounted for 99% of all exports, Oil revenues accounted for 87% of government revenues which in turn accounted for 32% of total GDP. Moreover, Oil GDP accounted for 38% of total GDP and indirectly accounts for the bulk on non-Oil GDP as the government’s orders drives non-Oil GDP (source: Country Report No. 17/251). A report by the author discusses this dynamic and the government response http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2017/07/17/economic-consequences-post-mosul/. Some highlights of which are “The government maintained overall spending on salaries and pensions, but it introduced new and increased existing consumption taxes on a large number of consumables while it also increased utility prices, Non-oil investments bore the brunt of the cuts as the government sharply curtailed all capital spending and investments.” https://markets.ft.com/data/commodities/tearsheet/summary?c=Brent+Crude+Oil Iraqi oil sells for about $5/bbl discount to Brent. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/05/23/market-review-elections-the-economy-and-the-stock-market/ The deficit of $17.6bn was based on IMF estimates made in 2017 (Country Report No. 17/251). The IMF has since then updated its revenue estimates higher based on higher oil prices which imply a much lower cumulative deficit than the one used here, but these estimates were only up to 2019 and hence old estimates are still used. Updated data is at: World Economic Outlook April 2018 & Regional Economic Outlook May 2018 in the two footnotes below. The estimates depend on IMF projections which assume that the government spending would continue to be constrained but this is unlikely given public demands for an ease as a result of higher oil prices. This will be balanced in this report’s higher oil price assumptions such that the surpluses would be the similar as will be seen later in this report and in the author’s other recent publications. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018 http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/MECA/Issues/2018/04/24/mreo0518 (data only until 2019) IMF Iraq Country Report No. 17/251 (http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17251.ashx). The IMF assumptions are used throughout for assumptions made in 2017, instead of available Iraq budget figures for 2017 & 2018, to ensure consistency with other estimates used throughout. Moreover, the data from the IMF country report 17/251 are used instead of the IMF updated data (footnotes above) as the updated figures provide only headline numbers without specific details that are needed for a full analysis. Note: figures are rounded, and so total figures might not add up fully. Below are the main differences between IMF projections and those of Iraq’s budgets for 2017 & 2018, and Iraq’s actual 2017 budget spending. Iraq’s budget vs IMF projections for 2017 Iraq’s budget Total revenues of $66.8bn made up of oil revenues of $57.5bn based on oil price of $42/bbl, and total exports of 3.75mbbl/d. These exports include the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d. The agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was for it to export 0.55mbbl/d through Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). In return the KRG would receive 17%, less sovereign expenses, of the federal budget. However, neither have fulfilled their obligations, yet, both of Iraq’s budget and the IMF budget assumptions include the KRG’s oil exports and its share of expenditure. Expenditures of $82.2bn, creating a deficit of $18.3bn. IMF projections: Total revenues of $69.2bn made up from oil revenues of $61.3bn based on oil price of $45.3/bbl and total exports 3.8mbbl/d, and non-oil revenues of $7.5bn Expenditures of $79bn, creating a deficit of $9.8bn Iraq’s preliminary budget vs IMF projections for 2018 Iraq’s budget Total revenues of $77.5bn made up from oil revenues of $65.2bn based on oil price of $46/bbl, and total exports of 3.888mbbl/d. These exports include the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d. Expenditures of $88.1bn creating a deficit of $10.6bn IMF Projections Total revenues of $73.9bn made up from oil revenues of $64.3bn based on oil price of $45.5/bbl, and total exports 3.9mbbl/d and non-oil revenues of $9.3bn Expenditures of $83.4bn creating a deficit of $9.5bn Iraq’s actual 2017 budget revenues and expenditures based on Ministry of Finance (MoF) data Oil revenues of $55.3bn, which exclude the revenues from the KRG’s direct exports of 0.55mbbl/d (included in the IMF projections in the table used and in Iraq’s budget planning). These revenues would have been higher than planned by the government which assumed an oil price of $42/bbl total, including KRG, exports of 3.75mbbl/d vs the realized price estimated at $49.2. They are also higher than the IMF est.’s which assumed a $45.5/bbl on total exports of 3.8mbbl/d. If the KRG’s exports of 0.55mbbl/d were sold at the same price, then total revenues would have been $73.6bn vs the Iraq budget plans of $57.5bn or the IMF’s estimate of $61.3bn. This reflects the budgets sensitivity of $1.4n to every $1 change in oil prices. Non-oil revenues of $9.9bn for total revenues of $65.4bn (ex-KRG oil revenues). Expenditures, which excluded the KRG’s share of the budget, were $63.8bn or showing a surplus of $1.6bn. If the KRG’s planned $6.4bn expenditures were to be included, total expenditure would have been $70.2bn vs the planned $82.2bn, which would have resulted in a surplus of $3.4bn. Note:* Revenues for 2017, and likely for 2018, benefited from higher than planned oil prices. But, expenditures in 2017, and likely in 2018, were lower than planned. The under execution of the budget expenditure, especially on capital spending, is an ongoing feature of Iraqi governments due to the country’s weak institutional capacity and which possess a risk to the reconstructing effort. Sources for this footnote: http://www.mof.gov.iq/obs/_layouts/obsServices/DownloadObs.aspx?SourceUrl=%2fobs%2fObsDocuments%2fYear-End+Report+Folder+-+????+??????+?????+?????%2fEnd-Year+Report+2017.xlsx http://www.bayancenter.org/en/2018/03/1461/ (http://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr17251.ashx). http://www.mof.gov.iq/obs/_layouts/obsServices/DownloadObs.aspx?SourceUrl=%2fobs%2fObsDocuments%2fYear-End+Report+Folder+-+????+??????+?????+?????%2fEnd-Year+Report+2017.xlsx Sources: IMF Iraq Country Report No. 17/251, IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2018 database, IMF Regional Economic Outlook (REO) statistical appendix, Iraqi Ministry of Finance (MoF). Assumptions: Updated figures for 2017 are from MoF which show revenues and expenditures for 2017 excluding those for the KRG. However, MoF and IMF estimates and planed budget include those of the KRG (see details in footnote 9). Iraqi oil price averaged $63.5 for Jan-Jun, while Jun’s average was $69.9. The YTD average is used as an estimate for the full year. Total updated revenues for 2018 & 2019 include higher non-oil revenues as the IMF in May’s REO increased its growth rate for non-oil GDP to +4.4%/+5% for 2018/2019 up from 2.4%/3.7% Revenues are estimates based on updated oil price assumptions while expenditures are the updated IMF’s estimates. Updated Expenditures reflect expectations that the government will ease back on its tight fiscal consolidation, however, they might very well be off-set by the historic tendency for lower budget executions. The IMF (Country Report No. 17/251 P: 28) notes “The program is fully financed through the next twelve months, but there is a financing gap of $7.1bn in late 2018 and 2019. The authorities have contacted one donor to fill the 2018–19 financing gap, for which there is good prospect”. The financing gap is made up of $5bn and $2.1bn respectively 2018 & 2019. Which implies that Iraq has achieved full financing for 2017’s $9.8bn deficit, $4.5bn out of 2018’s $9.5bn deficit., and $1.3bn out of 2019’s $3.4bn deficit. Since the actual budget achieved a surplus for 2017 and would likely achieve a surplus in 2018, then Iraq has borrowed $14.3bn ($9.8bn + $4.5bn see above) to fund a deficit that did not materialize and so the funds could either not be drawn which would lower overall debit or used to fund reconstruction projects. However, it should be noted that “fully financed” does not imply that the all of the funds were delivered to Iraq but that funding agreements were made. https://uk.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-iraq-reconstruction/factbox-pledges-made-for-iraqs-reconstruction-in-kuwait-idUKL8N1Q55RY This would be about 8.4% of 2019’s updated GDP estimate, but as it would be spent on reconstruction it would be a stimulus of about 14.5% of non-oil GDP. It would have an added significance in that the planned for deficits would have been accompanied by restricted capital spending and continued fiscal consolidation by the government, the reversal of which alone would have expansionary effects. The major shortcoming of the successive governments since 2003, was to use most of the oil revenues on expanding the public payroll and social security spending as main vehicle for transfer of oil wealth. As a result very little of oil revenues went towards reconstructing and building the country’s physical capital that would contribute towards diversification away from oil and to economic sustainability. The upshot is high oil dependence with the resultant vulnerability to external forces, import dependence, weak/small private sector and a skewed labor market. Without a fundamental change of track, such as that agreed by the IMF’s 2016 SBA, the fruits of the country’s expanding energy production profile as a result will perpetuate this process. However, this is unsustainable given Iraq’s large rapidly growing population whose needs for public sector jobs cannot be met under any optimistic scenarios for increased oil production or prices. The upshot, is the fundamental change of track along the SBA guidance will take a number of years to unfold, and as such the public-sector payroll and social security spending will continue to account for the bulk of government expenditure and thus the need for accessing the debt markets to fund reconstruction down the road. As can be seen from the author’s report on Iraq’s debt (link on next footnote) that Iraq’s only debt on truly commercial terms are two Eurobonds worth $3.7bn: A $2.7bn bond issued in 2006, due in 2028 with a 5.8% interest rate; and a $1.0bn bond issued in 2017, due in 2023 with a 6.5% interest rate. However, the third $1bn bond issued in 2017, due in 2022, is guaranteed 100% by the U.S. government, with a 2.1% interest rate, and as such does not constitute debt on commercial terms. Therefore, should Iraq access the commercial debt markets these would require fiscal discipline to assure the markets that debt would be serviced. Some of the requirements would take into account, debt repayments as a percentage of exports, currency stability and the level of foreign reserves in relations to months of imports, balance of payments, budget balance as a percentage of GDP. They would also take into account other liabilities and contingent liabilities such as the state guarantees discussed in footnote #22 below. All of these requirements will affect the amount of debt raised and the interest rate it would carry, which would place a much-needed significant fiscal discipline on the government. Coupled with the huge demands for reconstruction they should help ensure that Iraq’s governments pursue sound fiscal policies while following sustainable macroeconomic stability. Link to be provided in an updated version of this report. Updated figures in REO show that the updated figure for 2017 is $114.6bn of which foreign debt is $68bn. However, the older assumptions of 2017 are used as they are part of longer term projections, and crucially they served as the basis for Iraq securing finding for the expected deficits as explained in an earlier footnote. The IMF notes: “These arrears can be tolerated under the Fund’s policy on Arrears to Official Bilateral Creditors because the Paris Club Agreement was found to be adequately representative (i.e., Paris Club creditors provided most of the financing contributions required from official bilateral creditors in the context of that agreement) and the authorities have since been making best efforts to conclude agreements with non-Paris Club creditors on Paris Club comparable terms. Negotiations to implement debt relief on the same terms as with the Paris Club creditors, i.e. an 89.75 percent net present value reduction, are ongoing.”. In the current environment of the rebuilding of the relationship between Iraq and the GCC it is very likely that these negotiations will lead to a grand bargain in which both sides agree to the same 90% debt reduction in exchange for investment opportunities and long-term agreements. $122.9bn less: (1) 90% of $41 or $36.9bn, (2) Unused deficit funding of $14.3 The IMF’s updated GDP figures for 2017/2018 are $197.76bn/ $223.3 and GDP/Debt ratios of 58%/54.4% It should be noted that the government has issued 11 state guarantees that affect the total amount of debt that it can take as these are contingent liabilities. These are a total of $36bn made of which the largest is $32.4bn in guarantees of service payments to independent power producers (IPPs) in the electricity sector for the 14 years of the contacts.* This makes it essential for the government to continue with the electricity sector reform and ensure the collection of tariffs-the failure of which will make the state liable to fulfil its guarantees to the IPP’s which would add to the debt. Separately, the IMF aware of all of the above liabilities, in its presentation in the Kuwait Conference, had argued that Iraq should be able to borrow up to $36bn over the next five-years while its debt to GDP would be around 50% by 2022-23. These were made under lower oil price assumptions, with more fiscal discipline in expenditures, over a longer time frame, but without the benefit of the 90% haircut to the $41bn in debt. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/02/22/its-not-the-donations-stupid-key-points-from-kuwait-conf/ – _edn4 The IMF has attributed reconstruction for increasing its non-oil GDP growth rates to +4.4%/+5% for 2018/2019 up from prior +2.4%/+3.7%. These figures could be higher should the full $88bn in reconstruction spending be embarked upon over the next five years as that would be a stimulus equivalent to about 14% of non-oil GDP in each year over the five-year period. While, it is ambitious to assume that all of that amount would be properly spent, yet even half that amount would create the conditions for self-sustaining economic activity for the non-oil sector. Please click here to download Ahmed Tabaqchali’s full report in pdf format. Mr Tabaqchali (@AMTabaqchali) is the CIO of the AFC Iraq Fund, and is an experienced capital markets professional with over 25 years’ experience in US and MENA markets. He is a non-resident Fellow at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq-Sulaimani (AUIS). He is a board member of the Credit Bank of Iraq. His comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment. Source: Iraq-BusinessNews.com. Post your commentary below.
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  • SamsonGold's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 07:30 AM
    SamsonGold replied to a thread Silver in The Dinarholic Lounge
    https://srsroccoreport.com/why-harry-dents-400-forecast-for-gold-is-wrong-price-is-heading-up-much-higher/ Here is a link to a great article by srsrocco that shows EROI may play a huge part in the future prices of gold and silver. And why production costs keep a floor in price.
    10 replies | 965 view(s)
  • SamsonGold's Avatar
    06-15-2018, 07:22 AM
    SamsonGold replied to a thread Silver in The Dinarholic Lounge
    Your statement may turn out to be prophetic. Silver is gaining interest again. But I do believe that the physical price will disconnect from the paper price this year and next. It has been a long seven years, but when I compare that to the wait from 1980, it doesn't seem so bad.
    10 replies | 965 view(s)
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