Hue Mi
10-13-2011, 06:20 PM
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The Kurds And The US After Withdrawal (http://www.rudaw.net/english/science/op-ed-contributors/4046.html)
11/10/2011 02:14:00By SHAFIQ QAZZAZ (http://www.rudaw.net/english/author/admin/)
http://www.rudaw.net/english/thumbnail.php?file=shafeq_qazaz_opt_417421200.jpg&size=summary_small
The security agreement between Iraq and United States known as SOFA, signed in December 2008, demands the US terminate its military presence in Iraq by the end of 2011. It was created against a backdrop of the American public’s ongoing doubts about the factors that pushed the US into the war.
More than 4,000 American troops have died in Iraq so far, and the eight-year US presence in Iraq has dealt a serious blow to the weight and prestige of the US in Iraq and the wider region. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates once said, “Whether we like it or not, we are not very popular” in Iraq.
The American withdrawal from Iraq in this way brings an end to the dualism between the military and civilian establishments in the US and the need for a longer stay which was not initially expected. The impact of eight years of war is not going to be erased from the memories of the American and Iraqi peoples anytime soon.
In other words, the US is not leaving Iraq victoriously and will not be very influential in delineating the future of Iraq once it has withdrawn. However, it will do its best to play a role in determining the nature of Iraq’s governance and domestic and foreign policies.
Looking at it from a geopolitical perspective, the US strategy in Iraq is the need to control a country that has the fourth largest oil reserves in the world and protecting the US hegemony in the region in general. In order to ensure this strategy, the US deems it necessary to continue the war on terror and confront Iran, a state that challenges that strategy.
"The US is not leaving Iraq victoriously and will not be very influential in delineating the future of Iraq once it has withdrawn"
To better understand this strategy while awaiting the US troop withdrawal, we need to distinguish between two points: First, that despite its hegemonic presence in Iraq over the past few years, the US has not been able to play a decisive role in resolving issues such as sectarian conflicts, national reconciliation, corruption, Kurdish-Arab tensions, restoring security and providing public services.
Moreover, for a long time there was a great deal of talk about national reconciliation, developing democracy and ending the tensions among Iraqi forces through the political process, but the entire process has been a failure.
The failure is more evident now that the government is run by a prime minister who has strong authoritarian tendencies, even though he does not appear to have full control over the system.
Amid all of this, the feeling of helplessness among American officials with regard to the situation in Iraq is coupled with their concerns about the dangerous conditions in a country that was expected to fare better.
A report by veteran politicians James Baker and Lee Hamilton in 2006 emphasized the need for a “strategic shift” in Iraq, asserting that Iraq can convince Kurds to lower the bar on their demands only through a strong centralized system, winning the public’s loyalty and establishing a united national identity.
To put it in another way, the report’s recommendations called for a government in Iraq that can save the country from falling off a cliff. This would have provided the opportunity or the Bush administration to have a speedier withdrawal less marked by defeat.
The events of the last few years showed that the report’s strategy was not realized. Eight years after the liberation of Iraq, Professor Michael Gunter says, “Most Shias and Sunnis try to restore the situation to the past… and there are some in the Kurdistan Region who believe it’s better for them to militarily confront Baghdad sooner rather than later lest in the future the balance of power would be less in Kurds’ favor.”
In the face of its decision to withdraw and the helplessness regarding the current situation in Iraq, the US should consider revising its unsuccessful strategy.
What one needs to expect and be aware of at this point (especially the Kurds) is the possibility of such a change in US thinking about Iraq. This will depend on the degree of US administration’s confidence in its ability to protect Iraq from disintegration.
It’s true that after the withdrawal of its forces, the US will be no longer responsible for the situation in Iraq, but Iraq’s present and future will be always a source of danger and strategic importance for the US.
In short, the question is whether the US today has the same unchangeable belief in the need to “protect Iraq’s territorial integrity” as stressed in the Baker-Hamilton report? Or to what degree the US today sees Iraq as a viable state?
So if speculation about a new way of thinking is fair, and if the US has developed a new understanding for the future of Iraq, the US can be more open to the need to seek common interests with the Kurdistan Region as a friend in Iraq’s political process.
"The US has already made promises for some sort of protection for Kurds"
Although the media and some official foreign policy circles are critical of the policies and performance of the Kurdistan Regional Government, there are critical views of Baghdad as well. Many experts provide a counterbalance by reflecting the Kurdistan Region’s views toward Maliki’s government, stressing the regime’s unilateral behavior, the weakness of the democratic process and violations of the constitution.
Speaking about the protection of US interests in the Kurdistan Region, former senior State Department adviser David Phillips states that the US can protect its interests in Iraqi Kurdistan by intensifying political and diplomatic efforts while strengthening economic ties between the west and region.
The Kurdistan Region and its capital Erbil serve as a center for diplomatic consulates and foreign businesses. In addition, its massive oil reserves and the region’s security -- compared to other parts of Iraq -- can all become factors for a new strategy regarding the present and future shape of Iraq.
If these positions reflect the US view to a degree, then the current US thinking toward Iraq can be prioritzed in the following ways:
1. The Constitution should be viewed as the law of the land and used as a roadmap.
It needs to be pointed out that the US is for amending some parts of the Constitution.
2. Disputes need to be settled over the extent of the Baghdad government’s powers and those of the Kurdistan Region as well as the issue of revenue-sharing (especially oil and gas).
3. It is expected that Obama will take a selective approach to applying recommendations from the Baker-Hamilton report. The disagreement over the Iraq war drove a wedge between most of the United Nations’ member states and Bush’s America. But today’s circumstances are different, and the US can ask the UN and the European Union to play a leading role in forming an International Support Group for Iraq which is one of the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report. The US might also want to have some of Iraq’s neighbors and others join such a group. The report’s suggestion that “Iran, Syria and other states” be included can be revised given the changes in the region.
It is easier for the UN and European countries to be part of an agenda that emphasizes the democratic process and commitment to the Constitution through an active Iraqi government that serves its people. The US has already made promises for some sort of protection for Kurds. And even though these promises do not bring about any immediate obligations, they will have their own effects.
So if the US now or in the future demonstrates a different kind of understanding and thinking regarding Iraq, and if Kurds had to confront Maliki’s government more openly, then they will need to act more courageously in becoming part of the above mentioned scenario.
Denise Natalie, an expert on Kurdistan, deems it necessary that “Washington delivers a message regarding the protection of Kurds under the current circumstances.” But she points out that the extent of the protection and support for the Kurds depends on the degree to which the Kurdistan Regional Government -- as the ruling entity in the Kurdistan Region and an active political actor in the region -- demonstrates that it is worthy of such a task in terms of both policy and action.
* The author is a former minister in the Kurdistan Regional Government and a veteran of Kurdish politics.
The Kurds And The US After Withdrawal (http://www.rudaw.net/english/science/op-ed-contributors/4046.html)
11/10/2011 02:14:00By SHAFIQ QAZZAZ (http://www.rudaw.net/english/author/admin/)
http://www.rudaw.net/english/thumbnail.php?file=shafeq_qazaz_opt_417421200.jpg&size=summary_small
The security agreement between Iraq and United States known as SOFA, signed in December 2008, demands the US terminate its military presence in Iraq by the end of 2011. It was created against a backdrop of the American public’s ongoing doubts about the factors that pushed the US into the war.
More than 4,000 American troops have died in Iraq so far, and the eight-year US presence in Iraq has dealt a serious blow to the weight and prestige of the US in Iraq and the wider region. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates once said, “Whether we like it or not, we are not very popular” in Iraq.
The American withdrawal from Iraq in this way brings an end to the dualism between the military and civilian establishments in the US and the need for a longer stay which was not initially expected. The impact of eight years of war is not going to be erased from the memories of the American and Iraqi peoples anytime soon.
In other words, the US is not leaving Iraq victoriously and will not be very influential in delineating the future of Iraq once it has withdrawn. However, it will do its best to play a role in determining the nature of Iraq’s governance and domestic and foreign policies.
Looking at it from a geopolitical perspective, the US strategy in Iraq is the need to control a country that has the fourth largest oil reserves in the world and protecting the US hegemony in the region in general. In order to ensure this strategy, the US deems it necessary to continue the war on terror and confront Iran, a state that challenges that strategy.
"The US is not leaving Iraq victoriously and will not be very influential in delineating the future of Iraq once it has withdrawn"
To better understand this strategy while awaiting the US troop withdrawal, we need to distinguish between two points: First, that despite its hegemonic presence in Iraq over the past few years, the US has not been able to play a decisive role in resolving issues such as sectarian conflicts, national reconciliation, corruption, Kurdish-Arab tensions, restoring security and providing public services.
Moreover, for a long time there was a great deal of talk about national reconciliation, developing democracy and ending the tensions among Iraqi forces through the political process, but the entire process has been a failure.
The failure is more evident now that the government is run by a prime minister who has strong authoritarian tendencies, even though he does not appear to have full control over the system.
Amid all of this, the feeling of helplessness among American officials with regard to the situation in Iraq is coupled with their concerns about the dangerous conditions in a country that was expected to fare better.
A report by veteran politicians James Baker and Lee Hamilton in 2006 emphasized the need for a “strategic shift” in Iraq, asserting that Iraq can convince Kurds to lower the bar on their demands only through a strong centralized system, winning the public’s loyalty and establishing a united national identity.
To put it in another way, the report’s recommendations called for a government in Iraq that can save the country from falling off a cliff. This would have provided the opportunity or the Bush administration to have a speedier withdrawal less marked by defeat.
The events of the last few years showed that the report’s strategy was not realized. Eight years after the liberation of Iraq, Professor Michael Gunter says, “Most Shias and Sunnis try to restore the situation to the past… and there are some in the Kurdistan Region who believe it’s better for them to militarily confront Baghdad sooner rather than later lest in the future the balance of power would be less in Kurds’ favor.”
In the face of its decision to withdraw and the helplessness regarding the current situation in Iraq, the US should consider revising its unsuccessful strategy.
What one needs to expect and be aware of at this point (especially the Kurds) is the possibility of such a change in US thinking about Iraq. This will depend on the degree of US administration’s confidence in its ability to protect Iraq from disintegration.
It’s true that after the withdrawal of its forces, the US will be no longer responsible for the situation in Iraq, but Iraq’s present and future will be always a source of danger and strategic importance for the US.
In short, the question is whether the US today has the same unchangeable belief in the need to “protect Iraq’s territorial integrity” as stressed in the Baker-Hamilton report? Or to what degree the US today sees Iraq as a viable state?
So if speculation about a new way of thinking is fair, and if the US has developed a new understanding for the future of Iraq, the US can be more open to the need to seek common interests with the Kurdistan Region as a friend in Iraq’s political process.
"The US has already made promises for some sort of protection for Kurds"
Although the media and some official foreign policy circles are critical of the policies and performance of the Kurdistan Regional Government, there are critical views of Baghdad as well. Many experts provide a counterbalance by reflecting the Kurdistan Region’s views toward Maliki’s government, stressing the regime’s unilateral behavior, the weakness of the democratic process and violations of the constitution.
Speaking about the protection of US interests in the Kurdistan Region, former senior State Department adviser David Phillips states that the US can protect its interests in Iraqi Kurdistan by intensifying political and diplomatic efforts while strengthening economic ties between the west and region.
The Kurdistan Region and its capital Erbil serve as a center for diplomatic consulates and foreign businesses. In addition, its massive oil reserves and the region’s security -- compared to other parts of Iraq -- can all become factors for a new strategy regarding the present and future shape of Iraq.
If these positions reflect the US view to a degree, then the current US thinking toward Iraq can be prioritzed in the following ways:
1. The Constitution should be viewed as the law of the land and used as a roadmap.
It needs to be pointed out that the US is for amending some parts of the Constitution.
2. Disputes need to be settled over the extent of the Baghdad government’s powers and those of the Kurdistan Region as well as the issue of revenue-sharing (especially oil and gas).
3. It is expected that Obama will take a selective approach to applying recommendations from the Baker-Hamilton report. The disagreement over the Iraq war drove a wedge between most of the United Nations’ member states and Bush’s America. But today’s circumstances are different, and the US can ask the UN and the European Union to play a leading role in forming an International Support Group for Iraq which is one of the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report. The US might also want to have some of Iraq’s neighbors and others join such a group. The report’s suggestion that “Iran, Syria and other states” be included can be revised given the changes in the region.
It is easier for the UN and European countries to be part of an agenda that emphasizes the democratic process and commitment to the Constitution through an active Iraqi government that serves its people. The US has already made promises for some sort of protection for Kurds. And even though these promises do not bring about any immediate obligations, they will have their own effects.
So if the US now or in the future demonstrates a different kind of understanding and thinking regarding Iraq, and if Kurds had to confront Maliki’s government more openly, then they will need to act more courageously in becoming part of the above mentioned scenario.
Denise Natalie, an expert on Kurdistan, deems it necessary that “Washington delivers a message regarding the protection of Kurds under the current circumstances.” But she points out that the extent of the protection and support for the Kurds depends on the degree to which the Kurdistan Regional Government -- as the ruling entity in the Kurdistan Region and an active political actor in the region -- demonstrates that it is worthy of such a task in terms of both policy and action.
* The author is a former minister in the Kurdistan Regional Government and a veteran of Kurdish politics.