Seaview
07-22-2008, 07:07 AM
The strict position of certain parties regarding the Kirkuk issue and their insistence on dividing the governorate into four electoral districts could demonstrate a prelude for ending the objective alliance between the Kurds and those parties.
As the Kurdish political vision, the ongoing security recoveries in Iraq and the more masculine the Iraqi forces have become; both are the reasons behind encouraging those parties to take such a strict stance regarding the Kirkuk issue which is not in the best interest of Kurds.But for this stance those parties are not the only ones to be blamed, because the policy adopted by the Kurds for the last three years has contributed to push those parties towards this position.
We must admit that our policy during that three years was a policy of seizing opportunities, a policy which rarely resulted in good outcomes. Under that policy there were decisions taken for the greatest gains in the shortest time, namely before the recovery of security in Iraq in such a way that Kurds were often ungrateful for these achievements.
Lately, the KRG gratuitously created a range of problems with Baghdad that would not have any other advantages in practice expect for causing an uproar. These include lowering the Iraqi flag that created a wide range of adversaries to Kurds in and outside of Iraq. This action did not have any advantage at the local level. Kurdistan region then raised the flag without the stars. With the same criteria, Kurdistan region parliament passed a gas and oil law without waiting for approval from the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Pursuant to this law, KRG signed several oil contracts with foreign companies. As a result, the KRG oil contracts needlessly elevated tensions between KRG and Iraqi oil ministry and encouraged Shiites and Sunnis to unite their position on this issue.
KRG incited Baghdad over the custom issue since the customs tariffs should be restored to central government not to the regional authorities according to the constitution. Meanwhile, Kurds do not have a clear agenda in Kirkuk even though they have had a dominant power in Kirkuk provincial council since 2005 and they have controlled two key governorates and presidency of the council. Yet, Kurds could not play their cards to their own advantage.
The Kurdish arrogance has reached the extent of denying the Turkmens' right to have their language included on the sign above the entrance to the Kirkuk governorate.
All together, these point to the fact that the policy of seizing opportunities has brought about such a condition that the parties—after weighing in their favor—they are not more ready to give in under the pressure of Kurds.
Out past policy is full of shortcomings. The revision of this policy may provide an opportunity to reduce the strict position of adversaries-specially Kurds are no longer to seize the opportunities and impose their visions.
*Farid Asasard is a member of PUK Leadership Committee and Head of Center for Strategic Research.
http://pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5414&Itemid=1
As the Kurdish political vision, the ongoing security recoveries in Iraq and the more masculine the Iraqi forces have become; both are the reasons behind encouraging those parties to take such a strict stance regarding the Kirkuk issue which is not in the best interest of Kurds.But for this stance those parties are not the only ones to be blamed, because the policy adopted by the Kurds for the last three years has contributed to push those parties towards this position.
We must admit that our policy during that three years was a policy of seizing opportunities, a policy which rarely resulted in good outcomes. Under that policy there were decisions taken for the greatest gains in the shortest time, namely before the recovery of security in Iraq in such a way that Kurds were often ungrateful for these achievements.
Lately, the KRG gratuitously created a range of problems with Baghdad that would not have any other advantages in practice expect for causing an uproar. These include lowering the Iraqi flag that created a wide range of adversaries to Kurds in and outside of Iraq. This action did not have any advantage at the local level. Kurdistan region then raised the flag without the stars. With the same criteria, Kurdistan region parliament passed a gas and oil law without waiting for approval from the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Pursuant to this law, KRG signed several oil contracts with foreign companies. As a result, the KRG oil contracts needlessly elevated tensions between KRG and Iraqi oil ministry and encouraged Shiites and Sunnis to unite their position on this issue.
KRG incited Baghdad over the custom issue since the customs tariffs should be restored to central government not to the regional authorities according to the constitution. Meanwhile, Kurds do not have a clear agenda in Kirkuk even though they have had a dominant power in Kirkuk provincial council since 2005 and they have controlled two key governorates and presidency of the council. Yet, Kurds could not play their cards to their own advantage.
The Kurdish arrogance has reached the extent of denying the Turkmens' right to have their language included on the sign above the entrance to the Kirkuk governorate.
All together, these point to the fact that the policy of seizing opportunities has brought about such a condition that the parties—after weighing in their favor—they are not more ready to give in under the pressure of Kurds.
Out past policy is full of shortcomings. The revision of this policy may provide an opportunity to reduce the strict position of adversaries-specially Kurds are no longer to seize the opportunities and impose their visions.
*Farid Asasard is a member of PUK Leadership Committee and Head of Center for Strategic Research.
http://pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5414&Itemid=1